

Totem and Taboo in Romania: A Psychopolitical Diagnosis

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Long ago primitive people lived in small tribes led by despotic leaders. With his unlimited power, the leader or father considered all the women of the tribe his exclusive property. If the young men of the tribe, or sons, expressed jealousy, they were killed, castrated or excommunicated. Their fate unbearable, the young men joined forces, killed the father and ate him. But the father's influence would not disappear. In death he became more powerful.

This story was told by Sigmund Freud (1913), who explained that by eating the leader, the sons' hate was satisfied. The problem was, they had also secretly loved their father and felt guilty for killing him. In fact, the guilt feelings led them to renounce what they had set out to accomplish through his murder: because of their guilt, they could not have sex with the women of the tribe.

Told under the title "Totem and Taboo," Freud's tale is speculation on the unrecorded history of primitive mankind. To "reconstruct" a historical beginning that would explain the psychology of the collective mind and support what he was finding in the dark recesses of the human psyche, such as incestuous wishes and the guilt feelings they induced, he fashioned this explanation after having studied a variety of anthropological sources. His story continues: haunted by the ghost of their father, the sons replaced him with a horrible and strong animal, a totem. It absorbed the sons' ambivalence—the simultaneous hate and love

they were experiencing for their dead father. Since the ghost of their father lived in the totem, however, the sons were still not free of his influence, and their hate for him, as well as their love for him, continued.

While some primitive cultures developed human sacrifices and cannibalism to free themselves of a totem's influence, others developed rituals in which consumption of a symbolic animal totem was strictly forbidden on all occasions except special festivals, in which it was ritually killed and communally eaten, thus allowing all to disclaim responsibility for the killing. The sacrificed animal was then mourned by the entire clan, and an uninhibited celebration followed. The ritual mourning performed in primitive totem festivals is not parallel, however, to a gradual and effective work of mourning in which loss eventually is accepted and internal adjustments are made.

What interests us here is that the love and hate felt toward the father, or his image (the totem animal), led to a peculiar paradox. Hate killed the father, but a secret love caused him or his image to be kept within the sons. Since they ate the leader or what represented him, the leader "lived" in the sons. In psychoanalysis, the process of "eating" the other (psychologically speaking) and making oneself resemble the one who is lost is called *identification*. It is an unconscious process. And by unconsciously identifying with the other, we perform functions that were performed earlier by the now-gone "other."

The totem thereby developed other functions. According to one of Freud's sources, J.G. Frazer, "the clan totem is revered by a body of men and women who call themselves by the name of the totem, believe themselves to be of one blood, descendants of a common ancestor, and are bound together by common obligations to each other and by a common faith in the totem. Totemism is thus both a religious and a social system" (see Freud [1913], p. 105). Hence, the totem animal was used to maintain two useful prohibitions—one against killing the totem animal (patricide) and the other against having sexual relations with women of the same totem or clan (incest).

On Christmas Day in 1989, Nicolae Ceaușescu was "killed" by the Romanian people. A despotic leader who had ruled Romania for twenty-four years, Ceaușescu was the Communist Party Chief, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Chairman of the Economic Council, Head of the Securitate (Security Services), Chairman of the Political Academy, and the "architect" of a "new" Bucharest. He was the proverbial dreaded and yet secretly loved father figure. Killing him, especially on this sacred and symbolic day, gave rise to a reenactment of Freud's "Totem and Taboo," and while few today would openly admit that Romania was better off under Ceaușescu, he psychologically lives on in many ways, as well as symbolically through his "totem."

While the totems of primitive tribes are animals, plants, or natural phenomenon such as rain, in Romania the present leadership serves as a totem since it is perceived by many as an extension of Ceaușescu's regime, while also remaining different. Shared shame and guilt, as well as a secret love for Ceaușescu, and the inability to collectively and effectively mourn his death and the many changes and upheavals in Romania, has led to ambivalence about the current government. Some Romanians realize that while much has changed, much has not. They hate the aspects of Ceaușescu that the government embodies, but allow it to continue because it serves as a link with a past that they have not yet come to terms with. In turn,

Romania's leadership absorbs the people's ambivalence and plays a role, most likely without being aware of it, in keeping Ceaușescu's ghost alive through the continuation of some of his policies. Ethnic conflict between Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania has therefore continued.

This paper presents an example of psychopolitical diagnosis in which historical, legal, political and other issues are examined through a psychological lens so that one can begin to understand the emotional and mostly hidden societal processes that intertwine with and influence "real world" concerns. To effectively deal with ethnic problems such as those in Romania, it is necessary to use multiple perspectives, including psychoanalytic concepts.

Identifying psychological processes among the population in Romania that, though hidden, could still fuel ethnic animosity in this region was my specific task as a member of an American team of researchers headed by former diplomat Joseph Montville.¹ Hungarians make up the largest minority in the country, and ethnic strife between the two groups, especially in Transylvania, has been a chronic problem in Romania. Some observers in the United States feared that the trauma caused by the fall of Ceaușescu and the USSR, and Romania's subsequent search for a new identity and place in the world, could result in increased ethnic conflict or even open warfare between Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania. According to Gerner (1993), Hungarians are an especially significant category of ethnic minority in Romania given the fact that they are the defining majority in a neighboring state. I visited Romania for the first time in late February and early March 1993, more than three years after Romania's 1989 revolution and Ceaușescu's death. My plan was to interview former dissidents, parliamentarians from various political and ethnic parties, scholars, journalists and publishers in Bucharest, Romania's capital, and Transylvania. My findings are based on over thirty formal interviews conducted with a wide spectrum of influential Romanians and Hungarians, as well as informal interviews and discussions with many others during two trips to the region in 1993 and 1994.

Background History

Outside their native Hungary, Hungarians form a significant minority in Europe. Of Romania's 23 million people, 2.2 million are ethnically Hungarian.² The majority live in Transylvania, an area that has, throughout history, been claimed by both Hungary and Romania. The roots of Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania date back over a thousand years. According to traditional Romanian history, Roman legionaries intermarried with local Dacians (ancient Dacia is now known as Transylvania); those that remained behind after the Roman soldiers left established Romania's historical claim to the region. Hungarians, on the other hand, trace their lineage to Magyars who settled in the reportedly uninhabited mountainous heart of Dacia in the eleventh century. Therefore, both groups claim the area as their ancestral homeland, and strong emotions abound on the subject. As an illustration, Hungarian and Romanian émigrés attending a conference at Columbia University in the early 1990s nearly came to blows when discussing "whether a few Latin words contained in a Hungarian chronicle written around AD 1200 prove or disprove the presence of Romanians in Transylvania well before the belated arrival, in the ninth century, of the Hungarians" (Deák, 1992, p. 45).

The origin of “modern” Romania goes back to 1859 when the Ottoman Empire, which still included the areas now covered by Romania, was fast declining. That year, due to external pressure, the Ottomans consented to join the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia under one ruler. Thus, Romania was born, though it still remained a suzerainty of Istanbul (Sugar, 1977), and complete independence was not finally achieved until the Conference of Berlin in 1878. However, Transylvania, which is part of present-day Romania, had been given to the Hungarians by the Ottomans in 1699, long before the birth of “modern” Romania. Present day Romania was consolidated in 1918 after World War I through the inclusion of Transylvania, the Banat of Temelvár and other regions. In 1940, northern Transylvania and other areas were once again lost to Hungary, only to be reacquired in 1944. Needless to say, the constant border shifting and the balances of power that accompanied them have left their impact on the region.

In the last decade of the Ceaușescu regime, possibly in order to deflect attention away from deteriorating economic conditions, Romanian nationalistic sentiments were intensified. The government paid “relocation inducements” to ethnic Romanians for moving to Hungarian-populated regions and in turn curtailed cultural opportunities for Hungarians in Romania. Yet in juxtaposition to such issues of ethnic conflict in Transylvania is the historic legacy of periods of ethnic harmony. In 1568, while wars of religious intolerance were raging elsewhere in Europe, an atmosphere of acceptance and understanding prevailed in Transylvania. In fact, at certain points in history, Transylvania was a model for the coexistence of diverse nationalities and ethnic groups. But today, even though Ceaușescu is dead, harmony and coexistence has not returned.

Ceausescu and the Revolution

Nicolae Ceaușescu was born to a large and poor peasant family about one hundred miles west of Bucharest. After only a few years of formal education, he left his family at the age of eleven, moved to Bucharest, and in his teens became a communist. Although he was first jailed for his political beliefs, by 1948 Romania was a “people’s republic,” and Ceaușescu was welcomed into the Communist Party. He came to power in 1965 and ruled for twenty-four years. Yet he grew increasingly “paranoid” in the later stage of his reign. Many in the West were not familiar with Romania’s totalitarian leader prior to his sudden and violent fall, but nor was it a secret that Ceaușescu and his government were involved in extreme human rights violations, institutionalized discrimination, exile, harassment, and torture. Abortion was banned so that more Romanians might live to carry out his grandiose plans; to quell dissent, typewriters had to be registered with the police so that the source of any anti-Ceaușescu correspondence could be identified.

Romanian internal affairs did receive international attention in the 1980s, however, when Ceaușescu announced a plan to raze 8,000 of Romania’s 13,000 rural communities. While his goal was ostensibly to build a better Romania, it was also clearly targeted to destroy Hungarian settlements, although some Romanians and other minorities would also be affected. While the objective of “systematizing” rural Romania was never fully carried out, large parts of Bucharest were leveled in order to build new structures confirming the superiority of Romanian culture and its Roman lineage. In 1985, a fifth of historic Bucharest was bulldozed. Over 9,000 homes, one cathedral, and more than a dozen churches, most of

which had been built in or before the nineteenth century, were resolutely destroyed. In their place Ceau|escu ordered the building of *Casa Poporului* (“House of the People”) and the three-kilometer-long “Avenue of Socialist Victory.” Next to the United States’ Pentagon, *Casa Poporului* is the biggest building in the world, covering a surface area of thirty acres.

A substantial portion of Romania’s limited resources were devoted to turning Bucharest into “the first Socialist Capital for the new socialist man.” Before his death, Ceau|escu visited *Casa Poporului* a few times each month and often ordered major alterations. In the late 1980s, a crew of 20,000 worked on the project around the clock. Ceau|escu died, however, before the house and the Avenue of Socialist Victory were completed. Today, the white, four-tiered structure has been renamed “Parliament House” and the avenue, *Bulevardul Unirii*, (“Unity Avenue”).

That the Romanian revolution was sudden and came as a surprise did not mean there was no resistance to the regime until Christmas of 1989. Ironically, Bishop Laszlo Tökes, today the most outspoken critic of the current government, was also the leading personality of the 1989 Romanian revolution which overthrew the Ceau|escu regime. In 1986, Tökes, a Reformed (Calvinist) minister and ethnic Hungarian, was “temporarily assigned” from a location in northern Transylvania to a church in downtown Timi|oara, a city in southern Transylvania with a mixed population. His tenure there was supposed to end on December 15, 1989, at which time he was expected to return to his former parish. According to one story, Tökes first got into trouble when he allowed students to recite nationalistic poetry in church. Some months later, he was “urged” by the government to relocate to another church or face suspension from the ministry.

Tökes’ congregation, who liked the young and charismatic minister, rose to his defense and demanded that he remain in Timi|oara. Upon notice of eviction, 200 congregation members came to guard him on December 15, 1989. Things were bound to come to a showdown. As in similar power plays that were occurring in communist-dominated countries throughout Europe (this being the era of *glasnost*), Tökes courted the press and played the role of Hungarian spokesperson. Needless to say, his predicament was highly publicized, and the people of Timi|oara, including Romanians, flocked to the scene to show their support.

The next day, Timi|oarans marched to Communist Party Headquarters and destroyed it. One witness said the crowd “went crazy as if everyone was under hypnosis.” National songs were sung that called on Romanians to awaken, and shouts of “Down with Ceau|escu!” were heard. That Ceau|escu had managed to suppress such volatile emotion for twenty-four years was a testament to the oppressive police state he ran. On December 17, Ceau|escu’s forces fired on and killed some 100 demonstrators. Two days later a general strike was called and the people of Timi|oara filled the streets.

Cut off from other parts of Romania by phone and travel, Timi|oara was isolated.³ Residents had no idea what was happening in other regions, while in the rest of the country, the events in Timi|oara were being casually referred to as “ethnic disturbances.” So how the “revolution” spread to Bucharest and elsewhere is not clear. Robert Cullen (1990), a journalist and a keen observer of the communist world, states that the people in Bucharest learned about the events in Timi|oara by listening to the BBC on Radio Free Europe. There

are, of course, scholarly papers on this topic, but for my “psychopolitical diagnosis,” I was most interested in people’s perception of events instead of “The Absolute Truth.” However, those whom I spoke with in Romania could not enlighten me on the matter. In fact, there was an aura of ambiguity regarding the first few days of the revolution.

Meanwhile, on December 17, as riots continued, Ceau|escu held a meeting with his Political Executive Committee in Bucharest. Soon after this, he left on a previously planned three-day visit to Iran. When he returned on December 20, he made a television address in which he blamed hooligans, irredentists (meaning Hungarians) and foreign espionage for the events in Timi|oara. A demonstration was then arranged to show support for Ceau|escu, who, accompanied by his wife Elena and the members of his Political Executive Committee, appeared at the rally and was greeted by cheers. But an unusual thing happened at this rally. Some people began shouting “*Ceau|escu dictatoru!*” (Ceau|escu the dictator!). The streets were soon filled with young people and the revolution in Bucharest had started.

I interviewed a woman who had been shopping in downtown Bucharest on December 21 when she encountered a crowd near the university, mostly comprised of young adults. Till then, she had not been aware of any revolt. Another woman talked of being in the street on a coffee break. She remembered a grandmotherly woman taking a girl to her violin lesson, a man walking with his dog, and a line of people waiting to buy bread. Meanwhile, history was in the making. The next day, the same woman came to a barricade and witnessed the death of eight people. That night she watched the event on television.

On the morning of December 22, seventy-one year old Ceau|escu, with Elena, narrowly escaped the Central Committee building by helicopter as hundreds of demonstrators seized the party headquarters. Capitalizing on the situation, disaffected party members such as Ion Iliescu, Romania’s current president, and Martian Dan, together with dissidents such as Radu Filipescu and Mincea Dimescu, took over the Romanian television station, announced the formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), and presented themselves as the new leaders of the country. But there was seemingly no previously organized coup or widespread dissident mobilization in Bucharest. How they actually managed to usurp power remains somewhat of a mystery. Many Romanians considered the NSF only an anti-Ceau|escu faction within the Romanian Communist Party, and feared one group of communists was being replaced by another. This perception further eroded any collective agreement that a real revolution had occurred.

Mystery surrounds the Ceau|escus’ capture. According to one story, the dictator and his wife were simply turned over to NSF representatives by General Victor Atanasie Stanculescu, who that morning had been asked to guard the Central Committee building⁴ (Stanculescu would later be named Romania’s Minister of Defense). Whatever the case, upon their capture, an NSF spokesman promised a public trial. Three days later, however, on Christmas Day 1989, it was announced that the Ceau|escus had been executed. They had been “tried” for nine hours and sentenced to death by a military tribunal. Heavily edited videotapes of the trial, execution by firing squad, and the crumpled dead bodies of the Ceau|escus were released for Romanians and the whole world to see. On the tapes, Stanculescu can be recognized in the court room. The corpses were buried in unmarked graves.

Post-Ceau|escu Romania

On the surface, many Romanians were happy that the dreadful man was gone, but after the initial excitement, most eventually also came to realize that little had really changed. Outside of few exceptions, no one had been tried during President Iliescu's term for the atrocious crimes committed before December 1989. Those who belonged to the Securitate and others who were involved in carrying out vicious human rights violations are still part of the society and the government. But most Romanians, in one way or another, felt shame for their previous affiliations with Ceau|escu or their previous fear of him. Even fundamentally decent people were "guilty" of something, ranging from joining the party and marching in Ceau|escu's parades, to cooperating with the Securitate, to simply benefiting from being a "good" communist. Romanians were aware that while other Eastern European countries had significant dissident movements, theirs barely existed, Gabriel Andreescu and Radu Filipescu notwithstanding. Yet Romanians never fully realized that with the end of Nicolae Ceau|escu, the "sons" had not only murdered but also "eaten" him. Having ruled Romania for over two decades, he had become part of them. With his death, part of each Romanian also died, yet their shame of being associated with him and their hidden guilt for "killing" him had to be denied.

Reflecting on the days following the revolution, Cullen (1990) said people in Bucharest reminded him of "survivors of a great storm or air raid, emerging from their shelters and blinking in the sunlight, as if a little dazed." Three years later, complete denial had set in. After speaking to some of the people whom Cullen had previously interviewed, it seemed that emotionally they were still not ready to deal with what had happened. "We want to forget," or "We will learn the truth and details later," were typical remarks. When I asked a few individuals if they ever had dreams of the Ceau|escus or the revolution, their astonishment was subtly rebuking. One of our contacts in Romania kept referring to Transylvania's recent ethnic troubles by saying, "To remember is not good. It is better to forget."

Occasionally, however, Romanians' collective denial would collapse. For example, when students in Bucharest began to question Iliescu and his colleagues' policies, coal miners from the Jin Valley came to Bucharest to support the NSF, shouting "Death to the Intellectuals." In September 1991, however, the coal miners returned to *protest* the new regime. Such bewildering changes of mind occurred in Romania as people struggled to adjust to life without the Ceau|escus. However, NSF managed to remain the ruling party. While almost 15 percent of the vote in the September 1992 election went to radical nationalist parties who were decidedly more pro-Ceau|escu than the NSF, Iliescu succeeded in winning re-election.

Having heard about the courage they had displayed, I had looked forward to meeting former dissidents of Ceau|escu's regime in Bucharest. I was quite surprised, however, by their desultory demeanor. Instead of heroes, I felt as if I were speaking to pale ghosts. They were able to describe their imprisonment and the physical abuse they suffered, but just barely, and one dissident kept referring to himself as "you"—as if his former "dissident self" was an object of the past. I imagined that, without an oppressive and brutal environment, his "dissident self" could no longer be maintained—he needed Ceau|escu for it to survive. I also noted that there might be an even deeper meaning for his appearance. It seems that after the revolution, a home which had belonged to Ceau|escu's youngest son, Nicu, was given to

some of the revolutionaries to be used as an office. In the attic, they found a stock pile of cigarettes and liquor. What had secretly belonged to the enemy now belonged to them, so they consumed some of their findings, taking in aspects of Ceau|escu, as it were. But like the sons who could not have intercourse with the women of the tribe once they had killed and eaten the father, these heroes, because of their unconscious identification with Ceau|escu, could not enjoy their success and appeared to be depressed. Meanwhile, on a conscious level, they reported how great it was that the Ceau|escus were gone.

Identification with the Ceau|escu regime was also evident in June 1990 when former Ceau|escu supporters launched a weekly called *România Mare* (“Great Romania”), which, in a short time, acquired “the largest circulation of any Romanian weekly newspaper” (Gallager, 1992, p. 594). *România Mare* not only succeeded in rehashing the past, but also kept Ceau|escu “alive” through its undisguised nostalgia for his regime. In 1991 it praised “General Iulian Vlad, Ceau|escu’s last head of the Securitate, for his intellectualism and patriotism” (Gallager, 1992, p. 594). A year later, the founders of this weekly newspaper established a political party of the same name.

In another example, Shafir (1993) described an anomaly in the destitute state of Romania’s publishing industry. Although books had become a luxury that no one could afford, six novels by former intelligence officer Pavel Corut, in which he sought to rehabilitate Ceau|escu’s Securitate, had sold out almost immediately, and two more in the series were in press. In one novel, Bishop Tökes is portrayed as a Hungarian agent, while another passage maintains that “‘Hungarian revisionists ... ate the flesh of Romanians killed in December 1989,’ an obvious allusion to an ancient anti-Hungarian, nationalistic cliché that makes all Magyars out to be savages” (Shafir, 1993, p. 18).

Rising Tensions

During my first trip to Bucharest in March, 1993, a headline in *Libertatea*, a daily newspaper published in Bucharest, read: “*Laszlo Tökes acuza: În România se Practică - Indirect - Purificarea Etnică!*” Other Bucharest newspapers also reported the same story concerning Bishop Tökes’ accusation that ethnic cleansing was occurring in Romania. According to Tökes, the government was purifying Transylvania by oppressing and even expatriating the Hungarian minority. Other Hungarians joined Tökes to point out that the city of Cluj, the largest city in Transylvania, was predominantly Hungarian only a few decades ago. They accused the Romanian government of making life difficult for Hungarians in Transylvania. They also made public charges against the government-appointed chief of Romanian television, as well as Gheorghe Funar, mayor of Cluj, who they accused of making demagogic anti-Hungarian statements and fanning the fires of hatred by dwelling on the “Hungarian threat.” In the press, Tökes’ accusation prompted a deluge of remarks and editorials, many by Romanian political figures and writers, that referred to the Bishop as a temperamental troublemaker and a liar.

During my 1993 stay in Romania, Bishop Tökes, whatever his individual psychology might be, was loudly expressing the sentiments of the Hungarian layer of his personality. Thus, he had become a “symbol” for many Hungarians living in Romania. But unconsciously, I believe, he had another function—he also fulfilled a Romanian need. Tökes,

as a symbol, provided a target for their psychic energies, allowing them to focus on the Hungarian “threat” instead of the more complicated work of mourning and adaptation related to the drastic changes after Ceaușescu’s death. As an insightful Romanian told me: “Tökes provides a continuity of conservatism in my country.”

After the revolution, Hungarians living in Transylvania were able to form, with lightning speed, a broad-based political organization, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (HUDR). While careful to pledge its loyalty to the Romanian state, HUDR quickly announced its aims, which mainly centered around the creation of a Ministry of Minorities, the introduction of mandatory bilingualism in Transylvania, and the development of an education system in Hungarian that included an independent university in Transylvania.

In response to the creation of HUDR, Uniunea Vatra Românească (“Romanian Hearth Union”), simply referred to as “Vatra,” quickly emerged in Transylvania. Vatra was founded in Tîrgu Mureș on February 5, 1990, by artist Radu Coentea, and quickly spread. Vatra drew its “power” from the Romanian spirituality of Transylvania and the defense of the Romanian language, while also exploiting Romanians’ fears of Hungarians (Gallager, 1992). Coentea’s personal prejudice against Hungarians, however, seemed intertwined with Vatra’s aims. In an interview (Coentea, 1991) he stated that as a child his father had told him not to trust Hungarians, and that as an adult, he would not go to certain Bucharest restaurants for fear that Hungarians might attempt to poison him. In 1991, Coentea switched his base from Tîrgu Mureș to Bucharest and was elected chairman of the National Unity Party (PUNR) in March. In elections held on September 17, 1992, PUNR emerged as a political force in Transylvania.

We attempted to conduct an interview with a senator and four congressmen from PUNR, but it soon became clear that none of our questions really would be answered—instead we were given statements and exposition. Senator Adrian Meșiu reminded us, repeatedly, that in considering ethnic conflicts, we could not put everything in computers and trust their findings since computers do not reflect people’s emotions. We were told PUNR’s policy for the “solution” to ethnic problems in Transylvania was the “natural way,” which meant Romanians should not give in to any demand from the Hungarian minority since a response to one would have a matrushka doll effect. You open one doll and there is another one under it, and when you open the second one then you have to deal with a third, and so on. The senator gave us many statistics to show how well the Hungarians were doing in Transylvania and how they were not discriminated against.

In reflecting on PUNR’s positions, Meșiu remembered that when he was ten years old, a mentally retarded Romanian gardener was viciously killed, “just for fun,” by Hungarians in a park. He stated that the “occupiers” had come to Transylvania fully organized to settle forever and had even brought their own post office workers. Others joined the Senator to give us a list of historical grievances against Hungarians. They referred to the poor treatment Romanians received from Hungarians in the past, and spoke of fears that if HUDR’s demands were granted, it would lead to the establishment of a Hungarian “zone of influence.” According to them, Hungary wishes to build an exclusive economic sphere which includes Transylvania.

Cluj

After Bucharest, we traveled to Transylvania where the real “hot” problems were. On March 19, 1990, five thousand Romanians and Hungarians had demonstrated in Cluj, the principal city of Transylvania. On the same day in the ethnically-mixed city of Tîrgu Mureş, the first violent ethnic clash occurred, leaving eight dead and hundreds wounded. Government security forces quelled the violence and a commission was appointed to investigate the incident. The commission’s findings were not published until January 16, 1991, and only then because its publication was one of the conditions that would grant Romania observer status in the Council of Europe and make it eligible for EC assistance. In a television interview, the chairman of the inquiry commission called it a “theoretical study” (Gallager, 1992), but the potential for ethnic violence in Transylvania remained high though the situation there was soon foreshadowed by the tragic events in neighboring Yugoslavia.

Cluj, like Tîrgu Mureş, has a mixed population. Once a predominately Hungarian city, restrictions in the past decade on the public use of the Hungarian language, severe limitations on opportunities for bilingual education at secondary and tertiary levels, fewer job opportunities, and a Romanian settlement policy have turned Cluj into a predominately Romanian city. Hungarians now comprise less than a third of the city’s population, and their numbers may continue to decline as the city’s present ultra-nationalist mayor, Gheorghe Funar, feverishly continues with the past decade’s policy of “forced assimilation.” The stories told of him confirm the potential for ethnic violence there.

Initially, ethnic tensions had flared in the region over the appearance of the Hungarian word *áruház* (“shop”) that had been hung over a store, prompting a ban on all Hungarian advertisements and posters. The legislation, approved by Funar, made the prospects of bilingualism in Cluj almost impossible. One tale about Funar, while humorous, reflected his deep-seated fear of the “Hungarian threat.” When an ethnic Hungarian, Erno Jakap, applied to launch a private cable television service, he was not allowed to do so because the offerings included MTV. Funar apparently thought that MTV stood for Magyar Television (Williams, 1992).

A stranger to Cluj would not notice an “ethnic problem” there, unless, of course, he or she talked to people and heard their hurts and fears. When I spoke to Adrian Marino, a charismatic former dissident in his early seventies, I noted that his “dissident self” still existed. Unlike the dissident I had interviewed in Bucharest, who referred to his “dissident self” as “you,” the revolution was still going on for this aging activist. Marino’s fighting spirit remained alive through his opposition to Funar and those like him, who he saw as extensions of Ceauşescu. Furthermore, Marino had suspicions that some form of the Securitate was still in operation since he continued to get threatening letters accusing him of complicity with Hungarians and treason against Romania. The statue of King Hunyadi Mátyás in the center of Cluj, a reminder of the city’s Austro-Hungarian past, also served as the focus of Hungarian-Romanian tensions. Nevertheless, Transylvania was not, on the surface, a place where ethnic problems and oppression were readily discernible. However, I am reminded that such problems can come about with great speed and emotion. Perhaps influenced by the events in nearby Bosnia, Europeans have become involved in Transylvania to serve as buffers against malignant developments. I think the events in Bosnia also played a role in restricting ultra-nationalist Romanian forces from pressing their goals, for there is

nothing like a big fire in your neighborhood to make you more cautious and careful of starting your own.

Complications of Mourning

On my way from Cluj back to Bucharest I met an amiable Romanian engineer who offered to show me some interesting places in Bucharest and tell me about her people. The fact that she was not a government official or a political activist offered the chance for a different perspective. I not only accepted her kind invitation, but asked if she'd be willing to show me the national cemetery. By now, through my psychopolitical work, I had learned the importance of visiting symbolically important places as a means of getting to the heart of ethnic pride and concerns. The next day we took the underground metro, a gift from Ceau|escu to the people of Bucharest, to the cemetery.

Like many cemeteries, the national cemetery is surrounded by a wall. Outside the main cemetery gate, in a small area named "Heroes of the Revolution," lay buried the casualties of the December 1989 revolution. From December 21 to December 23, some four hundred people died in Bucharest. Many others died elsewhere throughout the country, although reports vary on the total number of casualties. One government report gives a national count of 689, while other findings suggest more than 1,000, but it was only Bucharest's four hundred dead that were named the "Heroes of Revolution."

The white marble grave stones that mark the resting places of the "heroes" are all the same, except that on each is a different carved name and picture. On the side of one of the grave stones, challenging the perfect symmetry and sterility of the row, someone has erected a large metal sign questioning the death of the young woman lying there. This is a question many Romanians ask, but because of their collective denial, do not want to answer. Since many of Ceau|escu's followers are still in power and still promote his ideology, though indirectly or in a modified form, some Romanians refer to the events of December 1989 as "the so-called Revolution." There is also some confusion on just who the heroes were, since everyone who was killed during those three days, whether government forces or anti-Ceau|escu demonstrators, are buried in the same location. The ambiguity of the situation seems to prevent a proper mourning response, rendering the Heroes of the Revolution Cemetery an ineffectual memorial.

While we walked, my new friend recounted the story of seeing a student shot to death in front of the Bucharest television station, a young man who looked all of nineteen years old. I assumed he was under one of the tombstones, lost in the midst. Though she had recalled his death, she seemed to prefer "to forget." Sensing she wanted to move on, we proceeded through the gate into the national cemetery, and as soon as we did, her mood changed. Once more she was the proud Romanian.

The Romanian national cemetery, like Novodevichiye cemetery in Moscow, expresses the soul, the history, and the culture of its people. Its graves are not sterile and impersonal like those of the Heroes of the Revolution. I sensed my companion's delight at being among ancestors whom she could relate to unambiguously. Though alone in the cemetery, we noticed the deep footsteps from an earlier visitor who apparently had come to clear poet Mihai Eminescu's (1850-1889) grave, exposing colorful flowers, red berries and green leaves

placed there before the snowfall. Eminescu, a widely translated romantic poet, had elevated Romanian literature to one of its highest points and was a symbol of a past Romania when Bucharest was considered the Paris of Eastern Europe. The clearing of the snow was, I thought, a very poignant and revealing gesture. Blanketing everything, the snow seemed to symbolize the collective desire to keep things hidden, to cover the unsolvable struggle and trauma Romanians felt toward communism, the Ceau|escu, the revolution, and the “heroes.” And yet, a Romanian had had the urge to visit and honor Eminescu by clearing the snow from his grave site. The gesture stood for ethnic pride. Eminescu as a symbol of Romanian glory and pride had risen to the surface, unhidden.

Inside these walls, my guide too was beaming and proud. She began to read a poem inscribed on Eminescu’s tombstone without bothering to translate it into English. She pointed out other noteworthy neighboring graves: “Here lies this other poet, here lies that great writer. The perception of the Western countries that we are gypsies is not correct!” She was showing me her ethnic identity, supported warmly on that cold day by a cemetery of great ghosts. I was again given the impression that Romanians sought their new identity in a past dissociated from Nicolae Ceau|escu. Not happy with my promise to read Eminescu’s poems when I returned home, she insisted we find an English translation of his work in a bookstore. We quickly left the national cemetery and went from one shop to another, but unfortunately we could not find an English translation. I recalled that during the revolution the State Library was destroyed, cutting Romanians from their written heritage.

As we walked around Bucharest, my companion once more continued her story. As if to deny her painful mixed emotions, she suddenly said: “I am not ashamed of being a member of the Communist Party during my student days at the University.” It seemed her father had been a diplomat during the Ceau|escu regime and she had even gone to school with the Ceau|escu’s youngest son, Nicu. She commented that he had never received special treatment. She went on to speak of communism as a good idea that in practice did not work well. According to her, Romania’s problems should not be blamed on Ceau|escu alone, but also on “the system.” She expressed her opinion that many influential politicians who survived Ceau|escu and who were Communists have now changed their attitudes because the system changed.

Her parents still lived in the neighborhood where Ceau|escu had resided, and she asked me if I wanted to see her old home. I sensed she was making an effort, perhaps unconscious, to “go back” and review her past which had been changed by the revolution. In her own way, she was doing a bit of mourning. After all, mourning is a review of the past that allows all that has been lost to be fully registered, loosening up the emotional investment in them (Freud, 1917). Only then can the loss be accepted. Because my interest had “forced” her to think about the many changes in Romania, my new friend was able to mourn. Yet this was something that Romanians collectively could not yet achieve. I didn’t tell her what I was thinking but walked on. We had walked a mile or so when we came to the television station with its tall tower. In the station’s front garden stood a lonely grave marker made of carved wood. Less sterile and regimented than the grave stones of the “heroes” of the revolution, I suddenly realized that it might belong to the nineteen-year-old student whose death she had witnessed. She stood silent, and I noted that at least momentarily her “denial” of what had happened could no longer be maintained. It was a poignant moment.

Ceau|escu's neighborhood started on the other side of the television station. One of the best locations in Bucharest, the neighborhood boasted single family homes and walled gardens. A few children played in the snow not far from a house that had apparently been burned down during the revolution. As the bullet-ridden buildings attested, the serenity of the current atmosphere lay in sharp contrast to the events of a few years earlier. Walking through the area, I got a glimpse of how people in Bucharest felt about their dictator. Unlike the dissidents and other liberal intellectuals opposing Ceau|escu, some Romanians did not seem to hold a one-sidedly negative view of him. "He had done 'good things' and kept Romania's identity from becoming totally submerged under the Soviet power," my companion explained.

At dinner the next evening I sat next to an energetic urban planner and former dissident named Marina Celac. She told me that money had been raised to build a memorial for the "Heroes of the Revolution," including a contribution from the government. As a consultant to this project, Celac had supported a plan to model the monument after a small but emotionally and religiously significant church that had been destroyed by Ceau|escu, a gesture she believed was appropriate for those who had died. She was surprised, however, that a majority on the planning committee rejected the idea, choosing instead a design of massive proportions that reflected grandiosity and nationalism—Ceau|escu's trademark style. I felt that Ceau|escu also "lived" within this committee's collective mind, for it seemed an inappropriate and paradoxical means to honor those killed in his overthrow.

Romania Revisited

Our team returned to Bucharest a little over a year later in May, 1994, for our second evaluation of the political and social processes in Romania, although this time we also visited Hungary to see things from the other side of the fence. There seemed to be little physical change in Bucharest over the course of a year. Renovations in public places have been rare. Because of this, the decision to finish Ceau|escu's gigantic palace (to house the parliament and the supreme court) was interesting. Rather than reassessing present realities, completing the former *Casa Poporului* was going ahead as planned by Ceau|escu. There was also little change in the government itself. Funar was still the mayor of Cluj. The plans for the monument to be built in honor of the heroes of the revolution had changed, however. Now a more modest monument was in the planning stages.

Once more we conducted interviews with many who were connected with the Romanian and Hungarian sides. We heard stories and demands that were similar to those we had heard a year earlier. The officials from the government told us how everything was fine, and Hungarians who came from Cluj informed us of the continuing uneasiness, especially for their community in Transylvania. We also became increasingly aware that the new atmosphere of "quick democracy" had proven itself, as in other former communist countries, susceptible to the manipulation of criminals.

There were also encouraging signs pertaining to adaptive changes in Romania. In Bucharest, the ethnic sentiments about Hungarians did not seem to be a problem, unless politicians raised the issue. Transylvania and its ethnic problems seemed to be far away from the capital. Liviu Luca, president of the trade union *Petrom*, described the "harmony" of trade union members in Bucharest as far as ethnicity was concerned. Luca, who does not

speak English, had a healthy vision for the future. He was also very much aware of the Romanian preoccupation for finding a “new” large-group identity in the post-communist and post-Ceau|escu period. He told us the story of Bula.

Bula was the name given to a fictitious persona during the Ceau|escu regime that became the subject of shared jokes and, as such, a symbol of national character in his own right. A typical buffoon, he was an impotent, humiliated coward (in Romanian, “bula” is a vulgar term for penis). In one story, Bula goes to a meeting, opens his briefcase, pulls out a revolver, and aims it at Ceausescu. He shoots and shoots, but in their enthusiasm, the encouraging crowd pushes Bula to and fro, causing him to constantly miss the target in a pathetically comic manner.

Bula represented the Romanians under the communist regime. Because they were afraid of expressing their cynicism for the regime, their collective fear was transformed, through hate for the former dictator and his regime, into shame. Before the revolution, shame reigned over all other feelings and was also attributed to, as I mentioned earlier, their “participation” in the regime and system of social interaction. However, when the Ceau|escus were “killed,” so too was Bula, as one’s existence depended on the other. The union leader commented that now that their “national character” was gone, they were confused. Romanians were still in search of a “new” identity.

Discussion

Before a neutral third party can offer to help opposing sides in an ethnic-based conflict begin a constructive dialogue, it is first necessary for this third party to gather substantial preliminary information. From this information, an initial diagnosis is formulated and an intervention plan is developed. If the third party envisions bringing influential members of opposing groups together in order to begin a dialogue process in which rigidified positions will be loosened, it must be armed with extensive knowledge. This knowledge must be drawn from a variety of disciplines, including history, political science, economics and other social sciences. However, it is also vital that the preliminary diagnosis include an examination of the country’s and opposing group’s circumstances through a psychological lens (Saunders, 1990)—a psychopolitical diagnosis. For even if two parties in conflict intend to come together to discuss only a limited number of specific “real world” issues, psychological components will always be present beneath the surface, influencing even seemingly uncomplicated issues. This paper offers an example of the formulation of such an initial psychopolitical diagnosis.

The focus of my diagnosis in Romania centered on the Romanian’s complicated response to Ceau|escu’s death. It may seem like common sense to conclude that there would be difficulties in Romania following such drastic changes. However, I believe this paper offers evidence that there is far more behind this fact than meets the eye. Some ethnic tensions between Romanians and Hungarians from Romania would exist whether Ceau|escu ever came to power or not. However, when analyzing Romania’s present ethnic problems, we must also take into consideration the reaction to the revolution. The ambiguity about who were the Heroes of the Revolution and the mixing of the “god” and “bad” corpses at the cemetery in Bucharest was intertwined with the problems of mourning the loss of the dreaded

dictator and his regime. Because it has been difficult to effectively and collectively mourn the death of Romania's omnipotent leader and his era, many Romanian politicians have continued Ceaușescu's aggressive policies toward Hungarians. Gallager (1993) notes in reference to Funar, Cluj's mayor, that "the Mayor's preoccupation with the danger posed by 'anti-national forces' invites comparison with the later stages of the era of Nicolae Ceaușescu" (p. 27).

In conducting my own research, I found additional evidence to support such a statement. Although the father-leader had been killed, a totem had been created in his place. Funar and other ultra-nationalists, and perhaps even the government itself, exerted a totem-like influence over the Romanian people, blurring the dividing line between pre- and post-Ceaușescu Romania. In many ways, especially beneath the surface and outside Bucharest, things seemed to be "business as usual." Many leaders of Romania's communist party considered themselves "reformed" and remained in power. Nearly no one in Ceaușescu's regime had been tried for their role in past abuses. As described earlier, the plans for a monument to "the Heroes of the Revolution" suggested the presence of unresolved emotional complications in which the good intention to honor the "dead" was contaminated through the unconscious resolve to keep Ceaușescu "alive."

In "Totem and Taboo," Freud (1913) wrote that one of the most puzzling, but at the same time instructive, usages in complicated mourning is the prohibition against uttering the name of the dead person. The name is an essential part of a person's personality—an important possession. Freud thought that openly referring to the dead person by name unconsciously invited his ghost's return. During my two visits to Romania a few years after Ceaușescu's death, I noted a similar phenomenon. No one seemed to utter his name, as if he never existed. When attention was brought to this fact, the individual's response would be either a statement of how pleased he or she was that the dictator was dead, or more often the reply was that, "I don't want to remember." Yet I could nevertheless see that Ceaușescu's ghost lived on in many people and places.

From his meager beginnings, Ceaușescu succeeded in creating a personality cult. In a country that has been historically occupied and ruled for centuries by various outsiders who had their own empires, the image of the past might make Ceaușescu's chauvinism and hyper-nationalism appealing to many Romanians. With quick shifts from passivity to brutality, from sentimentality to indestructibility, he had become an "untouchable" leader. Toward the end, people seemed to hate Elena more than Nicolae, but since they were perceived as a "team," presenting both male and female sides of leadership, they were regarded as a "total parent" (Abse and Jessner, 1961). In spite of the "knowledge" of what he had done, it therefore has been difficult for many Romanians to free themselves from the psychological connection of his image. Gilberg (1984) states that, seen from the vantage point of a Westerner, the Ceaușescu cult had elements of pathology, but this personality cult "nevertheless is consistent with the Romanian historical tradition, in which the 'Domn,' or leader, lived in oriental splendor and claimed control over all aspects of people's lives.... Once again, history intrudes firmly and decisively upon the making of the 'new' political and ethical order" (p. 181).

Perhaps it is easier for us to imagine that when we lose a "good" leader, society may not wish to let him or her go. In the US, especially through the media, there continue to be

anniversaries and remembrances of John F. Kennedy, or occasionally of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It may be more difficult to understand why we keep “bad” leaders within ourselves even after they are gone. The answer lies in understanding the psychology of leader-follower relationships (Volkan, 1988) and the varying psychological mechanisms of identification, including identification with the aggressor. When we fear someone a great deal but perceive him as omnipotent, one way of dealing with our anxiety in relation to him or his image is to internalize his image and make it part of us. When this occurs at the collective level, the result is a paradoxical situation such as the one in Romania. Examination of this phenomenon also helps us to understand why neo-Nazi groups in Germany have kept Hitler “alive” and why there are many in Russia who look back with nostalgia on the reign of Stalin.

My perception of Ceau|escu’s “ghostly” hand still pulling some strings in Romania was thought-provoking and somewhat disturbing. Yet no one would expect miracles in only a few “transition period” years, and confusion and anxiety were to be expected. At the same time, there have also been some good signs concerning “progress” in Romania. During my first visit to Romania, there was a vote in the Romanian parliament to allow Hungarians from Hungary the right to buy businesses in Transylvania. Romanian ultra-nationalists had argued that it would pave the way for a Hungarian economic invasion of Romania, but the debate in parliament was more playful than serious, and I realized if they could debate such important ethnic issues with laughter, it might be possible for them to avoid the pitfalls of malignant xenophobia. Also, the Ceau|escus’ corpses were removed from their unmarked graves and reburied. A psychologically important change, this reburial will help make the Ceau|escus’ death more real since there is now a concrete place where they are known to rest. The people I spoke with liked this development, as it represented a form of atonement. “We do not need to treat them like dogs,” they said. I suspect that most Romanians will not visit the Ceau|escus in the near future, but knowing where they are buried will help them mourn their loss.

The most interesting sign that mourning over Ceau|escu could be initiated came from a film, *The Conjugal Bed*, written and directed by Mircea Danelive. Hidden shared social processes often find direct expression in art forms, as if the artists in a society become spokespersons of “hidden transcripts” (Harris, 1994). While Romanians in general denied their involvement with the Ceau|escu regime, or expressed only a superficial pleasure over the dictator and his wife’s death, artists like Danelive pointed out the continued unconscious or subtle preoccupation with Ceau|escu. Similar examples were evident in the Soviet Union when *glasnost* allowed the artistic expression of issues that previously could not be addressed. For example, in the Gorbachev era a Soviet motion picture entitled *Repentance*, set in a mythical town, symbolically dealt with the Stalin era through the depiction of a villain with obvious characteristics of Stalin (Volkan, 1988). In *Repentance*, the character representing Stalin dies and is buried, but his body is dug up, (symbolically, he is brought back to life), only to be buried again. This repetition reflected the psychology of mourning in that we let the dead “die” in a gradual fashion.

Similarly, Danelive’s *The Conjugal Bed*, an absurd comedy, “is full of shadows of the deposed dictator (Ceau|escu); it even takes as a motif the helicopter that spirited him away during his overthrow, which is evoked by copters, rotors, and even the pinwheels sold on the street by a former secret policeman” (Jenkins, 1995). But the film centers around Vasile, who

wants his wife Carolina to have an abortion, a clear contrast to the strict “pro-life” policies of Ceau|escu’s Romania. While the couple does not have enough money to pay for the abortion, in the long run it would cost less money than feeding another child. Vasile finds a copy of one of Ceau|escu’s books, which he learns may have significant resale value because it is thought to include Ceau|escu’s Swiss bank account number. All one needed to do was decode the secretly written numbers. This aspect of the plot is reminiscent of “Totem and Taboo” in that the leader remained powerful even after his death, and the attempt to take what was once his proved futile and paradoxical. The film also captured other “preoccupations” with Ceau|escu and his regime: should one hold on to them or let them go? The character Vasile was as confused as Bula. According to Jenkins’ (1995) review of the film, Vasile’s berserk, obtuse rage merely reflected society’s. Acknowledgment of anger or rage, any psychoanalyst could tell us, is a key element in acknowledgment that a change or loss has occurred; it is an important marker of mourning.

Nevertheless, it seems Romanians would rather forget about their past, to sweep it neatly under the carpet, to integrate quickly into Europe, NATO and the EC. But it will be necessary to face this past, to mourn the loss of the murdered father and his grandiose visions of Romania, if they are to avoid the same pitfalls, to successfully end and resist falling back into the legacy of past ways. If Ceau|escu can be swept under the carpet, then other issues, such as ethnic problems, can be treated in the same way. But buried or denied problems can also quickly ignite, setting the “carpet” covering them on fire, and burning down the house, as we see in what was once Yugoslavia.

At the international level, on October 7, 1993, Romania was formally admitted to the Council of Europe as a full member, despite objections from the Hungarian minority. At Strasbourg, where the Council held its summit on October 9, 1993, President Iliescu stressed Romania’s commitment to democracy and reform, though many members of the Council continued to be skeptical. And interestingly enough, some Romanians themselves also were skeptical about their government’s intentions. Dan Ionescu (1993) referred to a *Severin* article whose author stated that Romania’s government can no longer behave like “a pupil whose main concern is to cheat his teacher ... we still look upon the Council of Europe as an adversary or a political rival, not as a family into which we are accepted with all rights and obligations” (p. 45). Nonetheless, President Iliescu has made “politically correct” moves such as acknowledging the Romanian role in the extermination of Jews during the Nazi period.⁵ In 1995, prospects of Romania eventually integrating with Western economic and defense (i.e. NATO) structures remain good once its economic house is in order.

Meanwhile, some Romanians spoke of how the Western European countries, and the US, make “false conclusions” by finding a connection between the present Romanian regime and the old communist order simply to punish Romania. I think their protests should be examined carefully. My observations suggest that, though it is overtly denied, there is a covert psychological connection with the Ceau|escu regime on the part of the Romanian people. Therefore, we can say that the psychological conflict pertaining to denial and a desire to change the past, while secretly wishing to hold onto some aspects of it, persists in Romania, and that the answer to a “new identity” lies not in only traditional political debate, but in bringing “hidden transcripts” (Harris, 1994) to the surface for discussion. In this way, the Romanians’ new way of thinking of themselves and others can evolve.

There are many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Romania that are involved in a great amount of activity concerning Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania. A closer look, however, reveals a pattern in much of the work done on the issue of coexistence: Hungarians present their list of grievances or demands, such as a Hungarian-speaking university, and the Romanians counter with their own list of rationalizations. A “logical” discussion of the merits of each side then ensues, and seemingly never ends. The preoccupation with “lists” then becomes a way to support each group’s threatened identity, thereby causing a significant resistance to change. The NGOs that are involved in efforts to avoid Romanian-Hungarian conflicts are then trapped into attempting to negotiate and resolve the issues stipulated by each side’s list. Progress is minimal.

When one looks beneath the surface, as I have attempted to do here, a different approach seems more effective. Efforts at reconciliation should first focus on helping Romanians to loosen up their ambivalent investment in the recent past and mourn the end of the Ceau|escus. Once they are finally laid to rest, Bula then will develop a “new” identity that is free of humiliation, shame and guilt, thereby making improved interaction with Hungarians possible. Such a dialogue is difficult to foster, however, because many who have political power unconsciously identify with Ceau|escu and remain in power by keeping ethnic tensions alive. It may ultimately prove more effective to focus initially on Romanians and Hungarians in Romania separately, assisting each in sorting out its “new” identity, rather than repeatedly putting the groups together so they can dispute their lists.

As mentioned above, various art forms are one effective way to deal with the paradoxical influence of Ceau|escu. The media could also be similarly useful for disseminating personal stories of the revolution that assist in mourning. While there were intellectual discussions on past and present political ideology in newspapers, magazines, and television, there were, with few exceptions (see a story about Constatine Mih|ilescu and his role during the revolution that appeared in the weekly *Cuv|ntul*, March 2-8, 1993), no references to feelings and personal accounts about the events of the revolution. Such channels could be better utilized, but the poor management of the Romanian postal system has made the distribution of printed media to rural areas very difficult, and radio and television are still mostly under government control. In closing, I would like to reassert that the psychopolitical diagnosis presented here is intended as a supplement to evaluations of Romania through more traditional methods. It is also hoped that those who are involved in Romania as third party facilitators in ethnic problems will benefit from our findings.

Notes

1. The members of the “diagnostic” team were Joseph V. Montville of the Center for Strategic International Studies; Merle S. Lefhoff, Ph.D., an expert in public dispute resolution; Jerome Delli Priscolli, Ph.D., of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ dispute resolution program; and Vam|k D. Volkan, M.D., Director of CSMHI.
2. For example, besides 2.2 million residing in Romania, there are 600,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, and nearly 385,000 in Serbia. After the Serb’s ethnic cleansing activities started, 20,000 Hungarians took refuge in Hungary.

3. My informer, who was in Timișoara when the riot took place, told me that the people in the city could not phone to other cities. Robert Cullen, however, who in my estimation has written the most detailed account of the Romanian revolution, reports on the story of a woman in Bucharest who was phoned by a friend in Timișoara during the event. Her friend, in a carefully veiled statement, said only: "There is a big storm, and the sky is red." (Cullen, R. [1990], p. 102.)

4. See *Cuvintul*, March 28, 1990. Also *Le Monde*, April 26, 1990.

5. During World War II, Romania initially participated in the extermination of Jews (evidence suggests approximately two or three hundred thousand were killed) . After 1943, Romania protected the surviving Jews (about three hundred thousand) from Nazi Germany.

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